


TS 204206/72  
USIB-D-64.7/2  
CCPC-D-18/725X1A



18. That the CCPC continue to review and monitor the U.S. narcotics intelligence effort abroad, to keep the USIB informed of the status of this effort, to determine additional actions which should be taken, and to make recommendations for the improvement of the overall effort.\*

C. Approve sending sanitized copies of this report, without Section V, to all country teams.

*\*The CCPC considered recommending that a USIB committee be established to foster coordination of the overall narcotics foreign intelligence effort, at least until such time as the mechanisms and procedures for coordinating U.S. activities abroad against illicit narcotics were firmly established and proven workable. In view, however, of the existence of the Intelligence Subcommittee of the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control (CCINC) Working Group, this recommendation was not adopted. The CCPC is of the opinion that a USIB committee might be more effective than the Intelligence Subcommittee of the CCINC Working Group in ensuring maximum coordination within and tasking of intelligence agencies and capabilities.*

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## VII. MAJOR PROBLEM AREAS

### A. Background

Differences of opinion have long existed as to how best to attack the international drug control problem. Approaches to this problem have historically been law enforcement oriented. Since 1969, though almost all agencies of the U.S. Government have been called upon to apply their resources to some facet to the problem. The consequent mushrooming effort on the part of agencies to which the narcotics problem has been in most cases an entirely new endeavor has been superimposed upon the traditional law enforcement effort, both in the U.S. and abroad. With respect to intelligence support to this effort, these differences have resulted in the problems discussed in the following paragraphs.

### B. Law Enforcement vs. Intelligence Information Collection

1. The lack of agreement in Washington is reflected in the field, where representatives of the different agencies involved are confronted with the practical problem of operating in a foreign country and trying to dovetail their varying types of operation. One of the major problem areas is the lack of understanding of the roles and *modi operandi* of clandestine intelligence information collection agencies and law enforcement agencies in support of law enforcement activities abroad. Basically, clandestine information collection agencies do not engage in law enforcement activities, and CIA has no law enforcement authority. On the other hand, law enforcement agencies such as BNDD and Treasury do engage in collection activities in support of their enforcement mission. Difficulties arise primarily from two areas: (1) how deeply involved in law enforcement activities collection agencies become in order to protect the sources of the information which they collect; and (2) how much detail concerning their collection operations must be furnished to CIA by enforcement agencies to enable CIA to fulfill its coordinative responsibility. These problems are compounded by the fact that U.S. Government agencies have no law enforcement authority abroad and must work with police and other appropriate officials of the host government to which they are accredited.

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